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THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
TO PREEMPT CONTRARY STATE LAWS IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER MEDELLÍN V. TEXAS
SHAHRZAD NOORBALOOCHI
In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG after hearing the case three times.
In the final hearing, the court held that an informal executive policy against
the recognition of the Armenian Genocide was sufficient to preempt a
California law that provided such formal recognition. Scholars have criticized
this decision on grounds that it conflicts with one of the Court’s latest holdings
on foreign affairs preemption in Medellín v. Texas. The extension of
Medellín to foreign affairs preemption cases such as Movsesian III is
inappropriate, however, because Medellín involved highly unique facts in
three ways. First, the executive action in Medellín inherently and radically
conflicted with the will of Congress in that it attempted to execute a non-selfexecuting treaty into law by way of an executive memorandum. Second,
Medellín posed the unique threat of empowering international courts over
domestic courts, a threat that was absent in Movsesian III. Third, Medellín
involved the adjudication of a criminal matter, an arena in which the states
possess a quintessential and thus preemptively more resilient interest than the
insurance regulation matter at issue in Movsesian III.
Because of these essential differences between Medellín and Movsesian III,
the Ninth Circuit was correct in preempting the California law. Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Movsesian III was not only consistent with
precedent but also normatively sound. Movsesian III’s vision of executive
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authority, in which Congress’s will receives due deference, is more likely to produce
rational policy choices and accord with foundational democratic values.
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INTRODUCTION
On Wednesday, July 30, 2014, Republicans in the House of
Representatives voted to proceed with a lawsuit against the President
of the United States1 on grounds that he “ha[d] circumvented the
Congress through executive action.”2 Though a congressional lawsuit

1. Paul Kane & Zachary A. Goldfarb, House Clears Way for Lawsuit Against
Obama, WASH. POST (July 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
house-clears-way-for-lawsuit-against-obama/2014/07/30/7436aca6-1809-11e4-934984d4a85be981_story.html.
2. Rebecca Kaplan, John Boehner Announces Plans to Sue Obama, CBS NEWS (June
25, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-boehner-announces-plansto-sue-obama (quoting John Boehner on his reasoning for the lawsuit).
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against the President is unusual,3 such bitter debates over the
President’s power are not.4 In fact, this latest episode from the
House of Representatives continues a heated debate that has lasted in
American history since the Constitution’s inception.5
This debate took on renewed national significance in the years
leading to the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Medellín v. Texas,6
during which time the Bush Administration embarked upon a series
of remarkably aggressive executive actions.7 In recent years, however,
most scholarship on Medellín has focused on the judgment’s
significance for the status of international obligations in United
States courts.8 Less examined is the import of Medellín on foreign
affairs preemption and, specifically, the power of the President to
preempt foreign affairs-related state laws. The limited scholarship
3. See Andrew C. McCarthy, Boehner Is Bringing a Whistle to a Gunfight: A
Congressional Lawsuit Is Precisely the Wrong Weapon to Combat Obama’s Lawlessness, NAT’L
REV. ONLINE (June 28, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/
381453/boehner-bringing-whistle-gunfight-andrew-c-mccarthy (rejecting the premise
that a congressional lawsuit will be effective in limiting President Obama’s executive
overreach and describing alternative means for achieving such a result).
4. Jack Goldsmith, Suing the President for Executive Overreach, LAWFARE (June 30,
2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/suing-the-president-forexecutive-overreach (agreeing with Clinton Rossiter that allegations of executive
overreach have plagued all memorable presidents in American history).
5. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (arguing for strong executive authority in conducting foreign relations by
stating, “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise [sic] the
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities
will be diminished”). But see JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS NO. 1 (1793),
reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138 n.1, 147–50 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1906) (disagreeing with Hamilton’s views on presidential powers and stating the
“conclusion becomes irresistible” that the Constitution did not vest legislative powers
in the executive or executive powers in the legislature).
6. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
7. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND
THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 132–33, 314, 328, 330 (2007) (noting the
Bush administration’s aggressive stance on presidential powers post-9/11, including
the administration’s stance on warrantless wiretapping).
8. See Cindy Galway Buys, The United States Supreme Court Misses the Mark: Towards
Better Implementation of the United States’ International Obligations, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L.
39, 68–69 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court disregarded international
law in Medellín v. Texas and outlining the negative consequences that such
disregard carries for American foreign relations); Eric Posner, Medellín and
America’s Ability To Comply with International Law, SLATE (Mar. 25, 2008, 12:40 PM),
http://www.slate.com/content/slate/blogs/convictions/2008/03/25/medellin_and
_america_s_ability_to_comply_with_international_law.html (arguing that Medellín
signifies the United States’s evasion of international law).
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addressing Medellín’s impact on federal foreign affairs preemption
suggests that the case narrows the President’s authority over foreign
affairs preemption.9
This Comment takes the opposite view, arguing that Medellín does
not provide a widely applicable rule for foreign affairs preemption
cases. To demonstrate Medellín’s limited effect on the foreign affairs
preemption doctrine, this Comment will evaluate Movsesian v. Victoria
Versicherung AG (Movsesian I, Movsesian II, and Movsesian III),10 a series
of three appeals decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. In Movsesian I, the issue was whether a non-binding executive
policy refusing to recognize as genocide the Turkish government’s
mass killings of Armenians in 1915–191611 preempted a California law
providing such recognition.12 After twice reversing its decision, the
court, sitting en banc, held that the executive policy preempted the
California law because the California law did not concern traditional
state powers and intruded “on the field of foreign affairs entrusted
exclusively to the federal government.”13 This Comment argues that,
9. See, e.g., Cindy Galway Buys & Grant Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria
Versicherung and the Scope of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power to Preempt Words, 32 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 205, 205–06, 225 (2012) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Movsesian I granted too much power to the executive and cannot be upheld based on
Medellín); Michael D. Ramsey, International Wrongs, State Laws and Presidential Policies,
32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 19, 41 (2010) (contending that Movsesian I was
decided wrongly because the Supreme Court effectively limited the bounds of
presidential power to preempt state laws in Medellín by limiting American Insurance
Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), to “its facts”); Carolyn A. Pytynia, Note,
Forgive Me, Founding Fathers for I Have Sinned: A Reconciliation of Foreign Affairs
Preemption After Medellín v. Texas, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1413, 1438 (2010)
(asserting that Medellín “undermined all previous analyses of the issue” of federal
foreign affairs preemption and limited the President’s preemption powers).
10. (Movsesian III), 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied,
Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG,
133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013); (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener RuckversicherungsGesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013); (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d
1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
11. See, e.g., Donald Bloxham, The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative
Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy, 181 PAST & PRESENT 141, 141–
42 (2003) (chronicling the incarceration and murder of prominent Armenians on
April 24, 1915, the forced emigration of women and children out of Turkey into
Syria and Iraq, and the rape, kidnap, mutilation, starvation, and murder that
occurred along the way, culminating in the death of one million Armenians).
12. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1056.
13. Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077.
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contrary to what scholars have suggested, the Ninth Circuit was
correct in its final decision because Medellín did nothing to limit the
bounds of foreign affairs preemption.
Part I begins by contouring the historical distribution of the
foreign-affairs powers between the states, the President, and
Congress. Next, this Part outlines recent interpretations of this
distribution of power in Medellín and the three Movsesian decisions.
Part II argues that the Court’s judgment in Medellín does not limit the
bounds of executive authority and therefore does not conflict with
Movsesian III for three reasons. First, the President’s policy in
Movsesian III carried congressional acquiescence while the President’s
policy in Medellín inherently conflicted with congressional intent.
Second, Movsesian III did not involve the same shift of power from
United States’s courts to international courts as was present in
Medellín. Third, the Movsesian decisions involved the adjudication of
an insurance regulation matter, an area of law that is qualitatively
more susceptible to preemption than the criminal law matter in
Medellín. Because of these essential differences, applying the Court’s
decision in Medellín to federal foreign affairs preemption cases such
as Movsesian III is inappropriate.
Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit’s vision of separation of
powers espoused in Movsesian III was not only consistent with
precedent but also normatively correct. The vision of power-sharing
upheld in Movsesian III allows for cooperation and even conflict
between the President, Congress, and the judiciary. The presence of
such cooperation and conflict is more apt to produce rational policy
choices and accord with fundamental democratic values than a unitary
model in which the President acts alone and against little pushback.
I.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S PROMINENCE OVER THE STATES IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF THE
EXECUTIVE’S ROLE
A. The Federal Government’s Primacy in Foreign Affairs

It is an elementary truth in American constitutional law that the
power to conduct foreign affairs rests solely with the federal
government.14 Justice Sutherland, a Justice otherwise known for his

14. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 540, 575–76 (1840) (“It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to
make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation . . . .”);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“The
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sensitivity to states’ rights,15 epitomized this basic assumption in
United States v. Belmont16 when he stated, “in respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the
State of New York does not exist.”17 Accordingly, when a federal law
expresses the legislature’s intent to exclusively govern a matter
related to foreign affairs, courts will always give primacy to the federal
government over the states.18 However, when federal law on specific
foreign relation matters is unclear or non-existent, it remains
unsettled whether state law governing such matters is constitutional.19
In this gray area, foreign affairs preemption jurisprudence has
fluctuated between permissive and restrictive visions of the federal
government’s power to preempt state law.
At the permissive end sits the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs
preemption.20 Under dormant preemption, courts preempt state
laws that act upon foreign affairs, even in the absence of explicitly
conflicting federal law, on grounds that the Constitution delegates
foreign affairs matters solely to the federal government.21 If the
courts determine that a state law negatively influences U.S. foreign
relations with another nation, they can preempt that law even in the
absence of an explicit federal law on the matter.22

States are unknown to foreign nations . . . .”); see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 149 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that even those
Supreme Court Justices most sympathetic to states’ rights recognized that states have
a very limited role in foreign affairs).
15. See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 149 (noting that Justice Sutherland was a
“Justice[] known for [his] sensitivity to the claims of the states in the federal system”).
16. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
17. Id. at 331.
18. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003)
(acknowledging that preemption of conflicting state law by express federal laws such
as executive agreements and treaties is “straightforward” while preemption of state
laws containing no express preemption prevision requires further analysis to
determine whether the state laws conflict with the federal policies); see also infra note
33 and accompanying text.
19. See cf. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–17 (noting that when there is no
preemption clause in the federal law, the courts must infer whether the federal law
preempts the state law by assessing the extent of its impact on foreign relations).
20. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175,
203–04 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption] (outlining the
different formulations of foreign affairs preemption doctrine).
21. Id. at 203.
22. Id.; see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432–36 (1968) (holding that an
Oregon reciprocity statute unconstitutionally intruded on the national power over
foreign affairs, even though the Oregon statute did not conflict with any specific,
AND THE
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On the restrictive end, courts have limited the federal power to
preempt state laws to varying formulations of statutory preemption,
whereby a state law is preempted only if it in some way conflicts with
an express federal statute.23 Variations of such statutory foreign
affairs preemption doctrines include express foreign affairs
preemption, conflict foreign affairs preemption, obstacle foreign
affairs preemption, and field foreign affairs preemption.24
Express foreign affairs preemption occurs when a federal law
specifically declares its intent to preclude state regulation on its
face.25 For example, the Export Administration Act of 1979 includes
such a preemption clause, stating that the Act preempts any state’s
law, rule, or regulation pertaining to the “boycotts fostered or
imposed by foreign countries against other countries.”26 Congress’s
preemption power “flow[s] directly” from the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI and evokes no controversial federalism questions.27
Conflict preemption, on the other hand, requires no such express
mention of a statute’s preemptory intent.
Under conflict
preemption, a federal law preempts a state law if the state law renders
compliance with the federal statute impossible.28 For example, a state
statute may result in a consequence conflicting with the requirements
of a federal law.29 Obstacle preemption occurs when a state law
stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the objects and purposes of a

enacted federal law because adjudicating the state law forced state probate courts to
assess and criticize other governments and posed the threat of offending other nations).
23. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1179 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing the bounds of federal preemption when there is an “[a]ctual [c]onflict
[b]etween [f]ederal and [s]tate [l]aw”).
24. See Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 20, at 205–07
(outlining the various doctrines of statutory foreign affairs preemption).
25. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387–88 (2000)
(recognizing and operating under the assumption of the legitimacy of express
conflict preemption but holding that such express preemption is not required).
26. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, § 8(c), 93 Stat. 503, 524.
The Act was passed in response to boycotts against Israel by Arab countries.
27. See TRIBE, supra note 23, at 1172 (explaining that though cases involving
express preemption may raise “complex questions of statutory construction,” they do
not invoke controversial issues on the appropriate distribution of power).
28. See id. at 1179–80 (describing circumstances under which “‘actual conflict’ is
most clearly manifest,” including when federal and state law are “directly and facially
contradictory” and when “compliance with both is a literal impossibility”).
29. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962) (holding that a federal Treasury
regulation requiring that savings bond held in co-ownership pass to the surviving coowner upon the others’ death preempted a Texas community property law that
would have resulted in the passing of the bonds to the deceased’s son).
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federal statute.30 Such preemption requires that courts identify the
federal statute’s aims and determine that the state law sufficiently
obstructs achieving those aims.31 Finally, field preemption occurs
when the federal government creates a regulatory scheme of such
pervasiveness or possesses an interest so strong in regulating a matter
that it leaves no room for state action.32
Assessments of the normative values associated with either end of
the spectrum have evoked strong responses. At one end, scholars
have cautioned that a broad reading of the power to preempt state
laws grants too much power to the judicial branch.33 Over-reliance
on the judiciary, they posit, “dissuade[s] the more competent
political branches from performing [their] constitutional role[s]” of
foreign affairs lawmaking.34 As a result, such scholars, including
Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith, have argued for a minimalist
approach to judicial enforcement.35 Goldsmith accordingly contends
that courts should rarely go beyond utilizing express, conflict, or
obstacle preemption and eschew preemption in cases where federal
law is unclear or absent.36
At the other end, a narrow conception of foreign affairs
preemption threatens to undermine the federal government’s ability
to speak with one voice in conducting foreign affairs and can harm
the United States’s foreign relations with other countries.37 State
involvement in foreign relations can undermine the national interest
because state level actors do not bear the consequences of foreign
policy matters and therefore do not account for these consequences

30. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 1181.
31. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1941) (holding that a
Pennsylvania statute requiring aliens to register with the state and carry identification
cards posed an obstacle to achieving the objects and purposes of the federal Alien
Registration Act, which aimed to gather information from aliens while at the same
time respecting their civil liberties and leaving them free from the “possibility of
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might . . . affect our
international relations”); see also Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption,
supra note 20, at 205–06.
32. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 20, at 206.
33. Id. at 202–03, 205, 207.
34. Id. at 211.
35. Id. at 177.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Powers vs. “States’
Rights” in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (1999).
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in their decision making.38 As such, proponents of this position prefer
that courts intervene to stop state intervention in foreign affairs.39
The above framework establishes an outline of the historical and
constitutional distribution of powers in foreign affairs between the
state and federal governments. This framework demonstrates that
when federal law is absent or unclear on a foreign affairs matter, the
courts have granted states varying degrees of power to implement
their own laws. Otherwise, however, courts have recognized and
continuously affirmed that the power to establish foreign relations
policies lies solely with the federal government.40
B. The Amorphous Bounds of Executive Authority in Foreign Affairs
The question still remains, however, as to how this largely federal
power over foreign affairs is distributed within the federal
government between the President and Congress.41 The Constitution
grants only a few of the authorities commonly exercised by the
executive today.42 These limited constitutionally granted powers
include the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate, appoint and receive ambassadors, and little else.43 However,
by 1936, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp,44 the Supreme
Court had come to establish that “[t]he President is the sole organ of
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations.”45 Curtiss-Wright is one of two formative decisions in

38. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1250 (1999).
39. Id. at 1255–58.
40. See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 149–50 (expressing the unquestioned principle
that states are excluded from foreign affairs); TRIBE, supra note 23, at 656 (“The
declaration of Article I, § 10, that ‘[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation,’ or, without congressional consent ‘lay any imposts or duties on
imports or exports’ or ‘enter into any Agreement of Compact with . . . a foreign
Power’ are just a few manifestations of a general constitutional principle that,
whatever the division of foreign policy responsibility within the national government,
all such responsibility is ultimately reposed at the national level rather than dispersed
among the states and the localities.”).
41. See HENKIN, supra note 14, at 35 (surveying the progression of the President’s
enumerated and implied powers and the surrounding historical debate).
42. Id. at 31 (stating that a stranger looking at the U.S. Constitution would not be
able to discern that it is the source of today’s commonly accepted boundaries of
presidential authority in international relations).
43. See id. at 31, 38 (“On the face of it, this is all the Constitution empowers the
President to do in regard to other nations.”).
44. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
45. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall)).
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the Court’s jurisprudence on the bounds of executive authority in
foreign affairs.46 The other, demonstrating a dramatic shift in tone, is
the Court’s seminal 1952 decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.47 This section undertakes an analysis of these two cases and
the normative vision that each embodies in the balance of foreign
affairs’ powers between Congress and the President.
In American jurisprudence, Curtiss-Wright stands as the oft-cited
poster child for broad executive authority in international relations.48
In Curtiss-Wright, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Joint
Resolution passed by Congress empowering the President to declare
illegal the provision of arms to any nation involved in the Chaco
conflict if such a provision would prolong the conflict.49 The CurtissWright Export Corporation was charged with providing arms to
Bolivia, a country involved in the Chaco conflict and on which the
President had initially declared an arms embargo.50 Indicted for
conspiring to sell weapons of war under the Joint Resolution, CurtissWright argued that the Joint Resolution was an unconstitutional
abdication of congressional power to the President.51
Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, emphatically
disagreed, concluding that not only was the congressional delegation
proper but also that the President could have acted without
authorization from Congress in the first place.52 Though the Court
could have decided the case on narrower grounds, it took the
opportunity to recognize broad executive authority in foreign
affairs.53 Finding the President to be the most suitable candidate for
maneuvering foreign relations with other nations, the Court argued

46. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 72 (1990) (juxtaposing the Court’s vision of
executive authority in Youngstown from its vision in Curtiss-Wright).
47. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
48. KOH, supra note 46, at 72.
49. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 312, 322.
50. Id. at 311.
51. Id. at 315.
52. Id. at 319–20 (“It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power,
but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.”).
53. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 634–35.
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it was unwise to “requir[e] Congress . . . to lay down narrowly
definite standards” to govern the President.54
In its 1952 Youngstown decision, however, the Supreme Court
limited this previous recognition of broad presidential authority. In
Youngstown, the Supreme Court held that the President’s unilateral
take-over of a steel mill via an executive order was unconstitutional.55
President Truman had ordered the takeover after the mill’s workers
had threatened to go on strike as a result of a labor dispute with the
mill owners.56 Fearing that a strike by the steel mill workers would
undermine weapons production and the war efforts underway in
Korea, Truman ordered the takeover of the mill to grant the workers’
requests and prevent the strike.57 In justifying this act, President
Truman argued that the potential strike posed extreme risks to the
country’s national security. As such, the power to order the takeover
of the mill to prevent such risks was within his “inherent [executive]
power” as President and commander-in-chief.58
This time, to the surprise of constitutional scholars and policymakers, the Court disagreed.59 The Court reasoned that the seizure
of personal property was neither within the President’s powers as the
nation’s commander-in-chief nor within the President’s authority to
ensure that the laws were faithfully executed.60 Justice Hugo Black’s
opinion for the majority chose a formalistic reading of the Constitution,
wherein only Congress possessed the constitutional authority to make
laws.61 Accordingly, the Court found that the President’s unilateral
act was a transgression of this congressional authority.62

54. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 321–22.
55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583, 588–89 (1952).
56. Id. at 583.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 583–84.
59. Id. at 589; KOH, supra note 46, at 106 (explaining that by the time Youngstown
reached the Court, most expected the Court to side with the President as all nine of
the sitting justices had been appointed by Truman or Roosevelt, the Court “had
swept aside past decisions that had limited the power of government, whether federal
or state, to regulate economic and social affairs,” and Justice Jackson had himself
authored a pro-executive decision just four years earlier (quoting WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 64 (1987))); see also Chi. &
S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109–10, 113–14 (1948)
(recognizing that the Court should give deference to decisions involving presidential
discretion and finding certain executive actions unreviewable by the Supreme Court).
60. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–87.
61. KOH, supra note 46, at 106–07.
62. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–87.
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In a paradigmatic concurring opinion, Justice Jackson agreed with
the Court but went further to establish the now-classic tripartite
framework of executive authority.63 In the first zone of Justice
Jackson’s tripartite framework, the President acts with the express
consent of Congress and, therefore, receives wide latitude to exercise
that authority.64 In this zone, an executive act is unconstitutional
only if the federal government as a whole lacks the authority to
govern the matter under the Constitution.65 In such cases, the Court
would afford the President’s act the “widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon
any who might attack it.”66
In the second zone, which Justice Jackson named the “zone of
twilight,” the President acts without a grant or denial of authority
from Congress.67 In this circumstance, the legitimacy of the
President’s act depends on whether both the President and
Congress have the authority to act in that area and whether
Congress and the President share similar policy objectives.68
Because there exists an area in which the authority of Congress and
the President coincide, congressional inaction would “enable, if not
invite,” action by the President.69 Accordingly, if the President is
acting in an area that is entrusted to the executive branch, his acts
may deserve deference by the courts.70
In the third zone, Justice Jackson explained, the President’s act
directly conflicts with the implied or express will of Congress.71 Such
presidential actions are at their “lowest ebb” of authority and subject
to strict judicial scrutiny.72 In most cases falling within this category,
63. Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491, 524, 527–28, 532 (2008) (describing Justice Jackson’s structure to determine the
constitutionality of the President’s implied powers as the “accepted framework” for
the Court to decide the constitutionality of domestic application of international
commitments); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661, 669, 686 (1981) (finding
that Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework outlined in Youngstown gathers “together as
much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area [of executive
power]” and was “analytically useful” when the Court evaluated and ultimately upheld
the President’s seizure of assets linked to Iran during the hostage crisis).
64. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635, 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 635–37.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 637.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 637–38.
72. Id.
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the President must refrain from acting, modify his position, or pursue
congressional support for his action.73 Accordingly, Justice Jackson’s
concurrence carved out a specific place for both Congress and the
judiciary in determining foreign affairs’ policies.74
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson departed from the holding of
Curtiss-Wright in two ways. First, he rejected the Curtiss-Wright
majority’s “[l]oose and irresponsible use of adjectives” specifically the
use of “‘[i]nherent’ powers, ‘implied’ powers, ‘incidental’ powers,
‘plenary’ powers, ‘war’ powers and ‘emergency’ powers.”75 Further,
though recognizing a specific need for confidentiality and speed in
foreign affairs, Justice Jackson minimized Curtiss-Wright’s stark
delineation between foreign and domestic matters.76 In so doing, he
rejected Justice Sutherland’s insinuation that the judiciary should
defer to the President’s judgment whenever he evokes his
commander-in-chief, executive, or “inherent emergency” powers
from Curtiss-Wright.77
The decisions in Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown represent the two
prominent currents in the normative debate over the proper
distribution of power to the President in foreign affairs.78
Justifications for the Curtiss-Wright model give prominence to the
structural advantages enjoyed by the executive branch for the
conduct of foreign affairs.79 Such arguments generally claim that
because of the executive’s unitary structure, it is more suited to
conduct foreign relations.80 The executive is most able to identify
threats adequately, communicate such threats clearly, respond
73. KOH, supra note 46, at 109.
74. Id. at 109–10.
75. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646–47 (Jackson, J., concurring) (asserting that the
terms lack “fixed or ascertainable meanings” and are frequently used
interchangeably); KOH, supra note 46, at 109–10.
76. KOH, supra note 46, at 110.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 72–73 (describing how Curtiss-Wright comprises one dominant
conception of executive power while Youngstown comprises the other).
79. See John C. Yoo, Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 1341, 1345–46 (2001) (arguing from Thomas Schelling’s theory of
international relations that because the world is largely governed by anarchy, a
successful foreign relations strategy requires a unitary “rational national actor” who
is able to efficiently respond to international developments); see also Julian Ku &
John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the
Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 180, 199–205 (2006) (arguing that
there are strong functionalist bases for judicial deference to executive
interpretations of laws affecting foreign affairs, especially during war time).
80. Yoo, supra note 79, at 1345–46.
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swiftly, preserve secrecy when necessary, and assess the costs and
benefits of different courses of action.81 For this reason, the
President requires a highly centralized base of authority from which
to successfully conduct foreign affairs.82 Accordingly, proponents of
the Curtiss-Wright model argue against involving more parties such
as the judiciary and Congress in the President’s foreign affairs’
decision making process.83
In contrast, proponents of the Youngstown model, such as Stanford
University Professor Alexander L. George, considered by many to be
the greatest international relations scholar of his generation,84 point
to the dangers of foreign policy dominance by a single person.85
Such scholars argue that allowing the President’s decisions to go
unchecked may enable uninformed or bad policy making.86
Arguments for this model rely on historical mishaps such as
Watergate, the Vietnam War, the Iran-Contra Affair, and the War on
Terror to show that periods of expansive and unchecked presidential
power have by and large resulted in policies that have negatively
impacted the entire nation.87 As such, they instead argue for an
institutional structure in which Congress is revitalized to participate

81. See id. (arguing that the rational national actor must be able to act thus, and
that in the modern world, only the President can do so).
82. Id.; see also Ku & Yoo, supra note 79, at 199–202 (contending that the judiciary
is too diffuse to reach “speedy and unified interpretations” of ambiguous laws and
that the executive branch possesses structural advantages for accomplishing this end).
83. See Yoo, supra note 79, at 1345 (discussing the unitary rational actor approach
to foreign policy and noting that both realists and institutionalists assume such a
decision making approach in nation-states).
84. Barbara Palmer, Alexander George, “Giant” in International Relations, Dead at 86,
STAN. REP. (Aug. 23, 2006), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2006/august23/
obitgeorge-082306.html.
85. See generally Alexander L. George, The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making
Foreign Policy, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 752 (1972) (highlighting the benefits that
critical examination can have on decisions when the process is opened up to
individuals with ideological disagreements through multiple advocacy).
86. See KOH, supra note 46, at 105, 112–13 (explaining that when the President
goes to Congress and the public with a policy initiative, others can also “evaluate the
wisdom and legality of the action”).
87. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 67–
85, 165 (2010) (pointing out that Watergate, the Iran-Contra Affair, and the War on
Terror mark outbreaks of illegality from the executive branch and demonstrate the
dangers of a “runaway presiden[cy],” which will only accelerate in the years to come
if no action is taken); id. at 56–59 (outlining the institutional failures that paved the
way for executive overreach that culminated in the Iran-Contra Affair).
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in foreign policy decisions and in which the courts take an active role
in adjudicating matters of overreach by any single branch.88
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Medellín v. Texas
The Supreme Court, and the nation at large, found themselves in
the midst of exactly such controversy when Medellín v. Texas reached
the Supreme Court in 2008. Medellín involved a memorandum issued
by President George W. Bush attempting to supersede a Texas court
judgment sentencing Jose Medellín to death.89 On June 24, 1993,
Medellín and several of his fellow gang members captured 14-year-old
Jennifer Ertman and 16-year-old Elizabeth Peña as the girls walked
along railroad tracks to get home.90 The girls suffered for more than
an hour as six members of the gang took turns raping each girl.91
Then, the men strangled Jennifer with a belt, stomping on her throat
to make sure she had died.92 Another one of the men strangled
Elizabeth to death with one of his shoestrings.93 That man was Jose
Medellin, a Mexican national living in Texas.
Approximately one year after confessing to the crime, a Texas trial
court jury found Medellín guilty of capital murder and in a separate

88. KOH, supra note 46, at 166–84 (suggesting various specific measures to restore
balance between the three branches, including subjecting foreign policy initiatives to
adversarial review from Congress and other departments in the executive branch,
creating a core consultative group to monitor the output of the executive’s national
security apparatus, enhancing Congress’s access to classified and unclassified
information, utilizing statutory criminal penalties and even impeachment for
instances of executive overreach and legislating the framework established by Justice
Jackson in Youngstown).
89. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008); Consular and Judicial Assistance
and Related Issues, 2005 DIGEST § 2(A)(1)(a).
90. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; see also Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion
for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support at 3–5, Medellín v. Cockrell, No. Civ.A.
H-01-4018, 2003 WL 25321243 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2002) (providing the gruesome
details of the gang’s acts).
91. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; see also Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion,
supra note 90, at 2–5.
92. Joint Appendix at 17, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928),
2005 WL 189680 (providing the custodial statement of Medellín); Respondent
Cockrell’s Answer and Motion, supra note 90, at 5 (reporting that Medellín stepped
on one of the girl’s throats “because she would not die”); Allan Turner, First Execution
Nears in Victims’ Right Case, CHRON (May 14, 2006), http://www.chron.com/news/
houston-texas/article/First-execution-nears-in-victims-right-case-1881082.php
(describing that the gang members stomped on the girls’ necks “for good measure”).
93. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; see also Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion,
supra note 90, at 5.

NOORBALOOCHI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

702

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/20/2015 8:01 PM

[Vol. 64:687

hearing sentenced him to death.94 Counsel for Medellín raised a
post-conviction challenge to this sentence on the grounds that local
law enforcement officers had failed to inform him of his right to
contact the Mexican consulate, as granted under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention—to which the United States was a signatory.
Both the Texas trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected
this challenge, finding that Medellín had failed to show that “nonnotification of the Mexican authorities impacted . . . the validity of his
conviction or punishment.”95 Medellín then filed a habeas petition
in the district court, which the court denied on procedural
grounds.96 In response, Medellín filed a petition of appealability
before the Fifth Circuit.97
While Medellín’s case stalled there, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) pronounced judgment on Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals.98 In that case, the ICJ held that law enforcement officers in
the United States had indeed violated the Article 36 rights of
Medellín and fifty other Mexican nationals by failing to inform them
of their right to contact the Mexican consulate when they were
detained.99 The ICJ ordered that the United States review and
reconsider Medellín’s case “by means of its own choosing.”100
Despite this ICJ ruling, the Fifth Circuit rejected Medellín’s
petition.101 The Fifth Circuit argued that the Vienna Convention
provided no individually enforceable rights, and as such, the decision
of the ICJ had no precedential authority in the United States.102
Medellín then appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme
Court.103 Prior to oral argument before the Court, President George
W. Bush, fearing for the United States’s relations with Mexico, issued
an unusual Memorandum for the U.S. Attorney General. The
memorandum stated that pursuant to his authority as President, the
United States would discharge its international obligations under the
94. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; see also Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion,
supra note 90, at 4–5 (noting how additional facts were introduced during the
punishment phase of the trial).
95. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501–02.
96. Brief for Respondent at 4, Medellín, 552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 2428387.
97. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2004).
98. (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72 (Mar. 31).
99. Id. at 71.
100. Id. at 73.
101. Medellín, 371 F.3d at 279.
102. Id. at 280.
103. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), aff’d, 552
U.S. 491 (2008).
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Avena judgment and implement the ICJ’s decision.104 Based on
President Bush’s new memorandum, Medellín’s lawyers filed a new
post-conviction challenge in Texas courts under Texas laws.105 As a
result of this new challenge, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
from the Fifth Circuit, reasoning that the case would reach the
Supreme Court after the state court had made a decision on the new
challenge.106 The Texas Court, acting on the new challenge, held
that the President did not have the constitutional authority to
enforce the ICJ’s decision via a memorandum.107 Accordingly, the
decision reached the Supreme Court as predicted.
Once at the Supreme Court, the Justices agreed with the Texas
Supreme Court, holding that the President did not have the authority
to unilaterally enforce the judgment of an international court via a
memorandum. Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts reasoned
that while submission to the ICJ’s jurisdiction was obligatory because
of the United States’s treaty obligations under the Optional Protocol
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), enforcing
the ICJ’s judgment was not. The Optional Protocol said nothing of
ICJ decisions’ enforcement mechanisms.108 Article 94(1) of the
United Nations Charter was the only potential source for such an
obligation.109 The text of Article 94(1) stated, “[e]ach Member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ]
in any case to which it is a party.”110 The Court reasoned, and in fact
the Bush memorandum agreed, that the most plausible reading of
this language was that the United States had a “commitment . . . to take
future action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ
decision.”111 Because of this requirement for future action, the Court
concluded that Article 94 of the treaty was non-self-executing.112

104. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503; Consular and Judicial Assistance and Related Issues,
supra note 89, § 2(A)(1)(a).
105. See Ex parte Medellín, 206 S.W.3d 584, 585–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(providing the procedural history).
106. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666–67 (2005); Ex parte Medellín, 206
S.W. at 585–86.
107. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 348.
108. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 507–09; Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
109. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 500.
110. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1).
111. Id. at 508 (citation omitted).
112. Id.
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Then, evoking precedent, the Court reasoned that the
“responsibility for transforming an international obligation . . . into a
domestic law falls to Congress.”113 As the Court in Whitney v.
Robertson114 and Foster v. Neilson115 had established, non-self-executing
treaties could “only be enforced pursuant to legislation.”116 The
President’s attempt to execute this non-self-executing treaty without
such legislation conflicted with the “implicit understanding of the
ratifying Senate” and fell within Youngstown’s third category.117
Further, the Court found that neither its holding in SanchezLlamas v. Oregon118 nor the text of Article 94(2) required that U.S.
courts follow ICJ decisions.119 In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court held that a
state court did not have to exclude evidence obtained in violation of
Article 36 of the VCCR.120 Allowing ICJ interpretations to supersede
state procedural rules, the Court stated, “swe[pt] too broadly” and
could not be reconciled with the power of domestic courts to
adjudicate cases in the United States.121
Furthermore, the Court distinguished Medellín’s factual
circumstances from a 2003 foreign affairs preemption case called
American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.122 In Garamendi, the Court held
that the federal government’s existing scheme of adjudicating
insurance claims arising during the Holocaust preempted California’s
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA).123 The HVIRA
required California insurance companies who had sold insurance
policies in Europe during the Holocaust to disclose requested
information regarding such policies to the California Insurance
Commissioner or risk losing their licenses.124 Insurance companies
and the American Insurance Association brought action against John
113. Id. at 525–26.
114. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
115. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
116. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 526 (quoting Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194); see Foster, 27 U.S.
at 315 (“Until such act shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty to disregard the
existing laws on the subject.”).
117. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527.
118. 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
119. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509–10, 518.
120. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 349–50, 356; see also Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (stating
that States can implement the rights provided in Article 36 “in conformity” with
their own laws).
121. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 357–58.
122. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
123. Id. at 401.
124. Id. at 401, 411–12.
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Garamendi, the Insurance Commissioner of California, to enjoin him
from enforcing the legislation on grounds that it conflicted with
federal law.125 The Court found that the California statute interfered
with the national government’s conduct of foreign relations.126 The
federal government had already established an exclusive scheme in
agreement with Germany for adjudicating such Holocaust-era
claims.127 Even though this scheme did not expressly exclude state
action, the Court held, the President’s policies were sufficiently clear
and the California statute sufficiently impeding to this policy to
warrant preempting California’s statute.128
In squaring its judgment in Medellín with Garamendi, the Supreme
Court distinguished Garamendi as a “claims-settlement case[]
involv[ing] a narrow set of circumstances” that involved only “the
making of executive agreements to settle civil claims between
American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals.”129
Because cases of this character had enjoyed a long history of
congressional knowledge and inaction, they carried a presumption of
congressional acquiescence.130 In contrast, preemption of a criminal
judgment by way of a unilateral executive memorandum enjoyed no
such history of congressional acquiescence; therefore, the Court held
Garamendi bore no impact on Medellín’s outcome.131
The Medellín Court then went on to assess whether the executive’s
traditional powers to conduct foreign affairs justified the President’s
action.132 The Court found that they did not because in addition to
conflicting with the implicit understanding and will of Congress, it
was a radical usurpation of state authority, as historically recognized
and established in cases such as Engle v. Isaac.133 The memorandum,
if enforced, would “reach[] deep into the heart of the [s]tate’s police
powers and compel[ ] state courts to reopen final criminal judgments
and set aside neutrally applicable state laws.”134 As such, the Court

125. Id. at 412.
126. Id. at 420–25.
127. Id. at 421–25.
128. Id. at 420–25.
129. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 532.
132. Id. at 530.
133. 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
134. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532.
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concluded, the President’s memorandum was unconstitutional and
carried no preemptive weight.135
D. The Ninth Circuit’s Movsesian Decisions
One year after the Medellín judgment, the Ninth Circuit heard
Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG.136 In a series of three appeals,
the court assessed whether a California insurance regulation
recognizing the Armenian Genocide conflicted with an informal
executive policy against such recognition.137 In each of the first two
appeals, the Ninth Circuit utilized Medellín to reach a different
conclusion. The first Movsesian judgment (Movsesian I), decided by a
three-judge panel, alluded to Medellín to find that the President had
the power to preempt the California law.138 The second utilized the
same to find that no such power existed.139
At issue in all three Movsesian cases was Senate Bill 1915, which
amended the California Code of Civil Procedure to give California
courts jurisdiction over certain claims brought by “Armenian
Genocide victim[s].”140 The bill defined and formally recognized the
Armenian Genocide, stating, “[t]he legislature recognizes that during
the period from 1915 to 1923, many persons of Armenian ancestry
residing in the historic Armenian homeland then situated in the
Ottoman Empire were victims of massacre, torture, starvation, death
marches, and exile. This period is known as the Armenian

135. Id.
136. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 1067
(9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener RuckversicherungsGesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
137. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian III), 670 F.3d 1067,
1071 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
138. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1059–60 (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 524, to
demonstrate that “[t]he Constitution squarely, if not solely, vests . . . powers” over
policies concerning national security, a war in progress, and diplomatic relations with
a foreign nation “with the Executive Branch” and therefore permits the preemption
of the California policy).
139. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901, 906 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing Medellín, 552 U.S. at 531–32, to establish that “informal presidential
communications” have “limit[ed] preemptive effect . . . where Congress has not
implicitly approved such authority” and therefore could not preempt the California
policy in this case), withdrawing 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d
1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener RuckversicherungsGesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
140. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4(b) (West 2011).
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Genocide.”141 Three years later, Vazken Movsesian, an Armenian,
filed a class action suit against three insurance companies, Victoria
Versicherung AG (“Victoria”), Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG
(“Ergo”),
and
Munchener
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft
Aktiengesellschaft AGH (“Munich Re”).142 Movsesian and his class
argued that as beneficiaries to insurance policies issued by these
companies, he and his class were entitled to damages for the
companies’ breach of contract.143 In response, Munich Re filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that an executive policy against
recognizing the incidents occurring between 1915 and 1923 as
genocide preempted Section 354.4.144 As such, Movsesian and his
fellow class members could not utilize the legislation to seek damages
from the insurance companies.145
At trial, the district court disagreed with Munich Re and held that
the federal policy did not preempt the California statute.146 The
court reasoned that the matters governed by the California statute,
such as the statute of limitations for filing claims arising from the
Armenian Genocide, fall within a state’s traditional competence over
procedural laws.147 Further, the court reasoned that because the
policy had no more than a minute effect on foreign affairs, federal
policy did not preempt the California law.148
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court,
finding that the presence of a clear executive policy against the
recognition of the “Armenian Genocide” preempted the California
law.149 The court pointed to clear statements from the executive that
urged against recognizing the Armenian Genocide and expressed
that such action would impact negatively the United States’s national

141. Id. § 354.4 cmt. a.
142. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1055.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1054–55.
146. Id. at 1055.
147. Id. at 1062.
148. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Arzoumanian v.
Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795
(2013) (No. 12-9), 2013 WL 1945158 (“[T]here is no indication that [S]ection
354.4(c) has had any effect, incidental or otherwise, upon United States foreign
policy.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung
AG, No. 2:03-cv-09407, slip op. at 33 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2007))).
149. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1063.

NOORBALOOCHI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

708

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/20/2015 8:01 PM

[Vol. 64:687

security, foreign relations, and war efforts.150 The court noted that
Congress had on numerous occasions acquiesced to the wishes of
Presidents Bush and Clinton and repeatedly stalled resolutions
attempting to recognize the Armenian Genocide.151 Further, the
court reasoned that the preemptive powers of the federal policy
originated not from the classification of that policy as an executive
agreement or otherwise but “from the source of the executive
branch’s authority to act.”152 Because such matters of foreign policy
fall within the executive’s sphere of power, the President’s policy was
entitled to preemptive weight.153
However, one year later, the Ninth Circuit reversed its decision,
this time finding that the federal policy against recognizing the
Armenian Genocide was not clear and therefore could not preempt
California’s legislation.154 Starting with conflict preemption, the
court held that because the President’s policy against recognizing the
Armenian Genocide was neither contained in an executive
agreement nor clearly expressed in informal documents, there could
be no conflict preemption.155 Specifically, the court pointed to
statements made by President Obama as a U.S. Senator, in which he
expressed support for the recognition of the “Armenian
Genocide.”156
The Ninth Circuit elaborated that the federal
government knew about but had not challenged existing legislation
in thirty-nine other states recognizing the Armenian Genocide.157
Such inaction, the Court reasoned, evidenced the federal
government’s ambiguity on the policy.158 The court also rejected the
possibility of federal field preemption because it reasoned that the

150. Id. at 1057–59 (inferring from a series of presidential responses to House
Resolutions that recognizing the Armenian Genocide would complicate peace efforts
in the region, possibly result in harm to American troops in the field, and do great
harm to key relations with NATO allies).
151. Id. (referencing that House Resolutions 596, 106th Cong. (2000); 193, 108th
Cong. (2003); and 106, 110th Cong. (2007) were never brought to a vote after the
Executive expressed its concerns).
152. Id. at 1059.
153. Id.
154. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901 (9th
Cir. 2010), withdrawing 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 1067
(9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener RuckversicherungsGesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
155. Id. at 905–06.
156. Id. at 907; see also 154 Cong. Rec. 7039 (2008) (statement of Sen. Barack Obama).
157. Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 907.
158. Id.
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California law concerned an area of traditional state interest.159
Citing a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg from Garamendi, the
court placed the regulation of insurance in an area of state
responsibility.160 The court concluded that, given the presence of this
interest, the ambiguous expression of the presidential policy was not
strong enough to carry preemptive weight.161
Two years later, this time sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit
reversed its decision yet again.162 This time, it held that the
California law intruded on the federal government’s exclusive
power to conduct and regulate foreign affairs.163 The court held
that although on the surface the statute concerned rules of
procedure, its “true purpose” was to “send a political message on an
issue of foreign affairs by providing relief and a friendly forum to a
perceived class of foreign victims.”164 As such, the statute more than
incidentally touched upon foreign affairs because the adjudication
of the provision required a “highly politicized inquiry into the
conduct of a foreign nation.”165 Because this underlying purpose
conflicted with the federal government’s policy, the Ninth Circuit
held the California statute unconstitutional.166
II. MEDELLÍN’S SCOPE OF APPLICATION TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION
CASES IS MORE LIMITED THAN RECENT SCHOLARSHIP SUGGESTS
Despite what scholars have suggested, the Ninth Circuit correctly
found that Medellín did not pose an obstacle to its holding in
Movsesian III because of three essential differences between the two
159. Id.
160. Id. at 908 (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 434 n.1 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); see also McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59
Stat. 33 (1945). Since the passing of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Supreme Court
has recognized the power of the states to regulate insurance. See Grp. Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217–18 (1979) (“The primary concern of
Congress . . . in enacting [the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to] ensure that the States
would continue to have the ability to tax and regulate the business of insurance.”);
State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 452 (1962) (“[T]he
McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . provide[s] that the regulation and taxation of insurance
should be left to the States, without restriction by reason of the Commerce Clause.”).
161. Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 907.
162. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian III), 670 F.3d 1067, 1069–
70 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener
Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
163. Id. at 1075.
164. Id. at 1075–77.
165. Id. at 1076.
166. See id.
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cases. First, in Medellín, the President’s exercise of power radically
and inherently conflicted with the will of Congress, whereas the
executive policy in Movsesian III had repeatedly received
congressional acquiescence. Second, in Medellín, enforcing the Bush
Memorandum would have resulted in a transfer of power from
domestic to international courts, whereas enforcing the federal policy
in Movsesian III resulted in no such power transfer. Finally, in
Medellín, the President’s attempted exercise of executive authority
encroached on the quintessential state power over criminal matters,
whereas the executive policy in Movsesian III did not act upon an area
of such quintessential state concern.
A. While the President’s Policy in Medellín Conflicted with the Will of Congress,
the Executive Policy in Movsesian III Carried Congressional Acquiescence
In reaching the decision to disallow the President’s memorandum
to preempt the Texas court judgment in Medellín v. Texas, the Court
relied upon a characterization of Article 94 of the United Nations
Charter as non-self-executing.167 As such, President Bush’s attempt to
implement the treaty into law by way of unilateral presidential action
was a radical departure from the fundamental constitutional
allocation of lawmaking power to Congress.168 Legal scholars and
courts have consistently affirmed and reaffirmed that the authority to
pass legislation implementing a non-self-executing treaty rests with
Congress.169 The U.S. Constitution grants general law-making power
to Congress in the Necessary and Proper Clause,170 and since 1829,

167. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008). While it is debatable whether
the treaty was in fact non-self-executing, a matter taken up by the dissent, id. at 542–
46 (Breyer, J., dissenting), this question is immaterial to the analysis here as
President Bush’s memorandum operated under the assumption that the treaty was
non-self-executing and proceeded to attempt to unilaterally enforce it even under
this characterization.
168. Id. at 527 (majority opinion).
169. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1099–1100 (2000)
(reasoning that the Constitution unequivocally leaves the power to implement nonself-executing treaties to Congress). But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the
Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1937–38 (2005) (arguing that the text and
structure of the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause do not establish
that the power to execute non-self-executing treaties rests with Congress).
170. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
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the Court has continuously reaffirmed that this law-making power
encompasses the power to implement non-self-executing treaties.171
In Foster v. Neilson, the Court voiced this principle when it held that
the “legislature” bore the responsibility of enacting laws to implement
a non-self-executing treaty between Spain and the United States into
enforceable provisions of U.S. law.172 Justice Marshall writing for the
majority wrote, “when the terms of the stipulation import a contract,
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the
treaty addresses itself to the political . . . department; and the
legislature must execute the contract . . . .”173 Justice Marshall’s
opinion made clear that when a treaty is non-self-executing, it is
Congress who holds the power to execute it. Later, in Whitney v.
Robertson, the Supreme Court further affirmed this principle, stating
that “[w]hen [treaty] stipulations are not self-executing, they can only
be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect, and such
legislation is as much subject to modification and repeal by Congress as
legislation upon any other subject.”174
David Golove, one of the foremost scholars of treaty power and
implementation in the United States, also confirms the fundamental
nature of this principle, stating the power to pass legislation
implementing non-self-executing treaties, like the power to pass any
legislation to make federal law, “without doubt” lies with
Congress.175 This principle is so rudimentary to U.S. law, Golove
contends, that no one has ever really questioned it.176 Louis
Henkin, Professor Emeritus at Columbia University prior to his
passing in 2010, considered one of the most influential scholars of
international law and foreign policy, also affirmed this
understanding. In his seminal book, Foreign Affairs and the United
States Constitution, Henkin begins a section called “Congressional
171. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829).
172. See id.
173. Id. at 314.
174. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
175. Golove, supra note 169, at 1311 (“The constitutional text . . . makes . . . clear
where authority lies for implementing non-self-executing treaties: Congress is given
the authority ‘[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution’ not only its own powers, but ‘all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.’ The treaty power is without doubt such a power, and there has
never been any question but that Congress has the power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to implement any (constitutional) treaty made by the President and
Senate . . . .” (third alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18)).
176. Id.
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Implementation” by stating, “[w]hen a treaty requires domestic
legislation . . . only the Congress can supply them.”177
In light of this broad consensus, President Bush’s attempt to
implement the ICJ judgment, while acknowledging that Article 94
was non-self-executing, was a radical departure from a core pillar of
the American constitutional structure. Responding to this overreach,
the Court found that it was impossible for such action to acquire
congressional acquiescence because it was by its very nature at odds
with Congress’s will.178 The Medellín Court, therefore, placed the
President’s memorandum in Youngstown’s third zone of presidential
authority and refused compliance with its directive.179
The characterization of the executive policy in Medellín as
belonging in the third category of Youngstown distinguishes it from
Movsesian III in an essential way. Unlike Medellín, the presidential
policy in Movsesian III received congressional acquiescence numerous
times. This congressional acquiescence is evidenced by Congress’s
willingness to stall three separate House Resolutions as a direct
response to efforts by the President.180 First, in 2000, the House of
Representatives agreed to stall House Resolution 596 recognizing the
Armenian Genocide after President Clinton made extensive efforts to
halt the resolution from going to the floor.181 The resolution, which
used the phrase “Armenian Genocide” twenty-two times, formally
recognized the Armenian Genocide by detailing its atrocities and
expressing the federal government’s support and sympathy for its
victims.182 In response, President Clinton personally contacted
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and urged him not to bring the
resolution to the floor.183 In his letter, President Clinton expressed
177. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 204.
178. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527 (2008) (“When the President asserts the
power to ‘enforce’ a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he
acts in conflict with the implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate. His assertion of
authority, insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-self-executing treaties, is therefore
within Justice Jackson’s third category, not the first or even the second.”).
179. Id.
180. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052, 1057
(9th Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 1067
(9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener RuckversicherungsGesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). These failed resolutions
were H.R. Res. 106, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 193, 108th Cong. (2003); and
H.R. Res. 596, 106th Cong. (2000).
181. H.R. Res. 596.
182. Id.
183. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on a Resolution on
Armenian Genocide, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2225–26 (Oct. 19, 2000).
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concern that bringing the resolution would have “far-reaching
negative consequences” for United States’s efforts in the Middle East
and for improvement in the relations between Armenia and
Turkey.184 As a response to these efforts, the House agreed and never
brought the bill to a vote.185
In 2003, the House made another attempt to give formal
recognition to the Armenian Genocide in House Resolution 193.186
Again, the House never brought the resolution to a vote because of
executive efforts, this time by President George W. Bush and senior
officials from the State Department.187 In various letters, the
President and his officials expressed their opposition to the
resolution, and again, the House complied.188
In 2007, the House of Representatives brought another bill, similar
in content to the previous two, yet again attempting to give formal
recognition to the Armenian Genocide.189 The Bush Administration
again expressed its disapproval of the bill, strongly urging the House
not to bring it to a vote.190 In a letter from Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Speaker of
House Nancy Pelosi, the Administration emphasized Turkey’s central
role in the United States war in Iraq.191 The letter explained that
recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the French government
184. Id. Senior administration officials such as the Secretary of Defense Bill
Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Larkin, and Undersecretary of Defense
Walter B. Slocombe, as well as a bipartisan group of former national security and
military leaders, also all sent letters to the Chairman of the Committee on
International Relations, in which they, too, cautioned against the passing of the
Resolution. H.R. REP. NO. 106-933, at 14–18 (2000).
185. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1058 .
186. H.R. Res. 193, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1058.
187. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1058.
188. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush
Discusses Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Legislation (Oct. 10, 2007), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2007/10/20071010.html [hereinafter Bush Press Release].
189. H.R. Res. 106, 110th Cong. (2007).
190. Letter from Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., and Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y
of State, to Nancy M. Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Mar. 7,
2007), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070315-gatesandrice.pdf
[hereinafter Pelosi Letter]; see also Letter from Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., and
Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State, to John A. Boehner, Minority Leader of the House
of Representatives (Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_
hr/070315-gatesandrice.pdf.
191. Pelosi Letter, supra note 190, at 2.
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had resulted in Turkey’s terminating military contract negotiations
with France.192 Similar actions by Turkey towards the United States
would threaten the United States’s war efforts in Iraq and put
American troops at risk.193 In a press release by the White House, the
President further asked members of Congress to oppose the
Armenian Genocide Resolution.194 The statement cautioned that the
passing of the Resolution would undermine United States’s relations
with Turkey, a nation the President identified as a “key ally in NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and in the global war on
terror.”195 Upon the issuance of these statements, the House of
Representatives took no further action and the “Armenian Genocide
Resolution” went no further.196
Since 2007, the White House’s opposition to formally recognizing
the Armenian Genocide has remained the same. For example, the
President’s statements on Armenian Remembrance Day in 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 never used the phrase “Armenian
Genocide.”197 Moreover, on April 6, 2009, when a reporter asked
President Obama whether he would support a resolution recognizing
the Armenian Genocide in a press conference, President Obama
specifically stated that though his stance as a Senator had not
changed, he would not express his views on the matter because the
Turkish and Armenian governments had made progress on their own
in resolving the matter.198 That the President’s policy against the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Bush Press Release, supra note 188.
195. Id.
196. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movseian I), 578 F.3d 1052, 1059
(9th Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d
1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Arzoumanian v. Munchener RuckversicherungsGesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
197. Statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, 2014 DAILY COMP PRES. DOC.
286 (Apr. 24, 2014); Statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, 2013 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 270 (Apr. 24, 2013); Statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, 2012
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 302 (Apr. 24, 2012); Statement on Armenian
Remembrance Day, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 283 (Apr. 23, 2011); Statement
on Armenian Remembrance Day, 1 PUB. PAPERS 537 (Apr. 24, 2010); Statement on
Armenian Remembrance Day, 1 PUB. PAPERS 553 (Apr. 24, 2009).
198. The President’s News Conference with President Abdullah Gul of Turkey in
Ankara, Turkey, 1 PUB. PAPERS 446, 448 (Apr. 6, 2009) (“I don’t want to, as the
President of the United States, preempt any possible arrangements or
announcements that might be made in the near future. I just want to say that we
are going to be a partner in working through these issues in such a way that the
most important parties, the Turks and the Armenians, are finally coming to terms
in a constructive way.”).
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formal recognition of the Armenian Genocide continues to this day is
also evidenced by express statements in an amicus curiae brief filed
by the United States in Arzoumanian v. Munchener RuckversicherungsGesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG,199 in which the government argued
against the granting of a writ of certiorari.200 There, the Solicitor
General stated on behalf of the Executive,
Section 354.4 does not simply intrude on foreign policy judgments
made long ago by the United States. . . . Petitioners’ claims
implicate difficult questions of foreign policy, and the Executive
Branch has consistently responded to those questions by
encouraging Turkish and Armenian officials to engage in a
dialogue that acknowledges their shared history. California wants
to take a different approach . . . .201

In light of these statements by the President and his repeated refusals
to refer to an “Armenian Genocide,” it is clear the federal policy
against recognizing the Armenian Genocide has remained the same.
As outlined above, the presidential action taken in Medellín
inherently conflicted with the will of Congress, and the
presidential policy in Movsesian III received congressional
acquiescence on three separate occasions. Accordingly, Medellín is
in the third and lowest category of presidential authority from
Youngstown, while Movsesian III is in the second.202 Therefore, the
President’s policies are subject to far more scrutiny in Medellín
than they are in Movsesian III.203 In light of this essential difference,
applying Medellín to Movsesian III is inappropriate.
B. While Medellín Involved a Shift of Power from U.S. Courts to
International Courts, No Such Shift Was Present in Movsesian III
Medellín was also a highly unique case because enforcing the
President’s policy therein would have resulted in a dramatic
transfer of adjudicatory powers from U.S. domestic courts to
international courts. Warning of this threat, the majority in
Medellín wrote,
Medellín’s interpretation would allow ICJ judgments to override
otherwise binding state law; there is nothing in his logic that would
exempt contrary federal law from the same fate. . . . And there is
nothing to prevent the ICJ from ordering state courts to annul
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 148, at 16–17.
Id.
See supra notes 167–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
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criminal convictions and sentences, for any reason deemed
sufficient by the ICJ.204

The Court went on to say that “[e]ven the dissent flinches at
reading the relevant treaties to give rise to self-executing ICJ
judgments in all cases.”205
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas further evidences
judicial concern about the power of international courts.206 In
Sanchez-Llamas, the Court emphasized that Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution vests the authority to interpret and implement treaties as
federal law in the Supreme Court of the United States.207 The Court
reiterated the limits on the ICJ’s power in Medellín, stating,
“[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its
interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts.”208
In fact, scholars, such as D.A. Jeremy Telman at Valparaiso
University, have criticized Medellín on grounds that its reasoning was
guided more by this very fear rather than any plausible reading of the
Constitution or precedent.209 Telman argues that the decision in
Medellín is neither supported by the Constitution’s text nor the
Supreme Court’s recent case law.210 The drafters’ original intent in
creating the Supremacy Clause, Telman contends, was to “empower[]
the courts to enforce treaties at the behest of affected individuals
without awaiting authorization from state or federal legislatures.”211
As such, the Framers intended to create a presumption of self204. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 518 (2008).
205. Id.
206. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–56 (2006) (postulating that
because the Constitution gives the judiciary power to interpret federal laws,
treaties—which are on par with federal law—also should be interpreted by the
judiciary); see also Medellín, 552 U.S. at 518 (using Sanchez-Llamas to justify its
reasoning that ICJ judgments are not “conclusive on [American] courts”); Al-Bihani
v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting the application of the laws of
war in U.S. domestic courts in dicta).
207. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353–54. The Court stated, “[i]f treaties are to be
given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning . . . ‘is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,’ headed by the ‘one
supreme Court.’” Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
208. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 518 (alteration in original) (quoting Sanchez-Llamas,
548 U.S. at 354).
209. See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín and Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 380–83
(2009) (explaining that the majority opinion’s reasoning largely ignored the
“original meaning of the Supremacy Clause”).
210. See id. at 414 (stating that the Court reached its conclusion “[b]ased on an
abbreviated discussion of [early] cases and guided by relevant scholarship”).
211. Id. (quoting Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 696 (1995)).
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execution, wherein treaties are assumed self-executing unless they
expressly state otherwise.212 In finding the treaty in Medellín nonself-executing, the Medellín Court manipulated this requirement in
order to evade the possibility of U.S. courts submitting to an
international legal system.213
In the three Movsesian decisions, however, the enforcement of the
presidential policy would not have involved such a shift of power
from U.S. courts to international courts. The sole issue before the
Ninth Circuit was whether the enforcement of the executive policy
against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide preempted a state
policy that gave such recognition to the Armenian Genocide. This
decision bore no impact on the power of international courts to
adjudicate matters that lay at the heart of state powers. As such,
concerns with allowing preemption to go forward in Medellín were not
present in Movsesian III.
C. Medellín Involved the Adjudication of a Quintessential State Interest
While Movsesian III Did Not.
Medellín’s application to Movsesian III is further limited because
Medellín involved matters of criminal law while Movsesian III involved
insurance regulation matters.214 Because criminal law is an arena
unequivocally reserved to the states, it is qualitatively more
resilient to preemption than the insurance regulation matters at
issue in Movsesian III.215
It is indisputable that criminal matters fall to state courts in U.S.
legal jurisprudence. The Tenth Amendment entrusts states with
police powers to create and adjudicate almost all criminal matters.216
212. Id.
213. See id. at 415 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause was necessary to prevent the federal
government from being embarrassed by state regulation that substantially frustrated
the government’s ability to comply with treaty obligations.”).
214. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (stating that criminal
judgments and criminal state laws are at the very heart of state police powers).
215. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003) (holding that the
executive policy for handling insurance claims arising out of the Holocaust
preempted California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HRIVA) because it
impermissibly interfered with the President’s conduct of foreign affairs); In re
Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113, 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that
the executive policy in favor of the resolution of Holocaust-era insurance claims
through the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
(ICHEIC) preempted insurance benefits claims against Italian insurers under state
statute and customary international law).
216. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (declaring that all powers not delegated to the
federal government are reserved for the states).
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In Engle v. Isaac, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this basic principle,
stating, “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing
the criminal law.”217 In sum, Medellín appropriately characterized
criminal law as at the heart of states’ powers.218
Courts have recognized that the nature of the injury sustained, the
nature of the law at issue, and the institutional structure of a legal
system are relevant in determining whether to allow a foreign
judgment to prevail over a domestic one.219 In Hilton v. Guyot,220 the
Supreme Court’s paradigmatic case on the comity of nations, the
Court stated that whether a nation will allow the laws of other nations
to interfere with the enforcement of its own laws in its courts
“depend[s] on the condition of the country in which the foreign law
is sought to be enforced, the particular nature of her legislation, her
policy, and the character of her institutions.”221 Because criminal
matters quintessentially belong to the states in the “policy” and legal
“institutions” of American law, courts in the United States are less
likely to accept the contrary judgments of international courts over
the judgments of domestic courts in this arena.222
As the Guyot criteria suggest, the nature of the injuries sustained is
also relevant in deciding to allow international judgments or laws to
override domestic ones in the receiving state.223 In Medellín, the
injuries sustained were particularly gruesome. Medellín’s victims
were only fourteen and sixteen years old.224 The girls were taunted,

217. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982).
218. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 532.
219. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–67 (1895) (outlining the factors that
jurists have considered in deciding to allow the judgments of an international court
to have weight in the United States’s domestic courts); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS,
AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS,
SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS §§ 23–24, 28 (8th ed. 1883) (describing how the
structure and institutional framework of governments impact their openness to the
judgments of non-domestic courts under the doctrine of comity).
220. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
221. Id. at 164–65 (quoting STORY, supra note 219, § 28).
222. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006) (rejecting the
application of the Vienna Convention even though it created judicially enforceable
rights and allows a state to apply regular rules of procedural default); Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (per curiam) (refusing to grant habeas petition to
Paraguayan national convicted of rape and capital murder even though he had not
been informed of his Vienna Convention of Consular Relations (VCCR) rights).
223. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
224. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 501 (2008); Respondent Cockrell’s Answer
and Motion, supra note 90, at 3–5 (providing the gruesome details of the gang’s acts).

NOORBALOOCHI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

4/20/2015 8:01 PM

719

gang-raped, and then gruesomely strangled to death with their own
belt and shoelace.225 Though the persuasive force of these facts do
not make for good precedent,226 they inevitably figure into the
Court’s decision to disallow the enforcement of a foreign judgment
over domestic laws and judgments.227
Conversely, Movsesian III did not involve matters that were of such
quintessential state interest or the enforcement of an international
judgment. Movsesian III involved a California law that allowed
California courts to adjudicate insurance claims brought by victims of
the “Armenian Genocide” and extended the statute of limitations for
hearing such cases. Though the Supreme Court now recognizes that
states hold most of the power over insurance regulation,228 the history
of the allocation of this power between the federal and state
government has been one of tension.229
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence starting in Paul v. Virginia,230
its subsequent overturning in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n,231 and the final enactment of the McCarranFerguson Act demonstrate the historical tension between the federal

225. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 501; Respondent Cockrell’s Answer and Motion, supra
note 90, at 4–5.
226. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts the judgment.”).
227. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
228. Congress passed legislation to require that the Supreme Court recognize
state power over insurance regulations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012) (“Congress
hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of
the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation
of such business by the several States.”).
229. Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 626
(1999) (explaining the role of the states in regulating insurance policy and the
power struggle between the federal and the state governments in governing
insurance regulations).
230. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177, 180 (1868), overruled by United States v. S.-E.
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as recognized in Barnett Bank of Marion
Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1996).
231. 322 U.S. 533 (1944), superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No.
79-15, as recognized in Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A., 517 U.S. 25.
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and state governments.232 In the early days of the Republic, the states
held most of the power to regulate insurance. In Paul v. Virginia,
the Court canonized this allocation of power by rejecting attempts
by the insurance industry to shift the authority to regulate insurance
to the federal government. In Paul, the Supreme Court held, much
to the dismay of insurance companies that wished to benefit from
what they believed would be less aggressive federal oversight, that
insurance regulation was a state power and did not constitute
interstate commerce.233
In 1944, however, the Supreme Court overturned this holding in
South-Eastern Underwriters.234 This time, the Court held that insurance
regulation involved interstate commerce was subject to regulation by
the federal government and was therefore governed by the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.235 However, signaling the tension between the federal
and the state government, Congress overruled this holding by
enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act one year later.236 The Act states,
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.237

Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the power to regulate insurance
is largely restored to the states with exceptions for federal regulation
only in areas that involve the “business of insurance.238
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently characterized states’
interest in insurance regulation laws as weak.239 In Garamendi, the
Court held that California did not have a traditionally strong interest
in adjudicating matters regarding insurance claims and that federal
law preempted a California law requiring the disclosure of Holocaustera European insurance policies.240 While some have argued that the
232. 15 U.S.C. § 6701; Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A., 517 U.S. at 27–28; S.-E.
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 578–87, 592; Paul, 75 U.S. at 177, 180, 183.
233. Paul, 75 U.S. at 183 (finding that insurance was not a transaction of
commerce and, thus, could not be regulated by Congress).
234. S.-E. Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 552–53.
235. Id. at 582–88.
236. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015.
237. Id. § 1011.
238. Id. § 1012(b).
239. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003).
240. See id. (“The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by the state
statute are alone enough to require state law to yield. If any doubt about the clarity
of the conflict remained, however, it would have to be resolved in the National
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Court’s treatment of Garamendi in Medellín swung the pendulum back
in favor of the states by limiting Garamendi to its own “narrow set of
circumstances,”241 this contention is debatable for several reasons.
First, the text of the Medellín opinion suggests that the Court relied
upon the characterization of Garamendi as a claim-settlement case
only because it needed to establish that the policy therein had
enjoyed a long history of congressional acquiescence. Justice Souter,
writing for the majority in Garamendi, stated,
Making executive agreements to settle claims of American
nationals against foreign governments is a particularly
longstanding practice, the first example being as early as 1799 . . . .
Given the fact that the practice goes back over 200 years, and has
received congressional acquiescence throughout its history, the
conclusion that the President’s control of foreign relations includes
the settlement of claims is indisputable.242

By establishing that claims-settlement cases enjoyed 200 years of
congressional inaction, and that Garamendi was a claims-settlement
case, the court was able to grant Garamendi a presumption of
congressional acquiescence.243 Under this construction, the Court
could categorize the case under zone two of Youngstown and thus
justify the President’s preemption therein.244
However, the federal policy in the Movsesian cases possessed
specific evidence of congressional acquiescence and did not depend
on characterization as a claim-settlement case to fall into Youngstown’s
second category.245 Therefore, regardless of whether Movsesian III is
characterized as a claims-settlement case, there were sufficient
grounds on which to find the presence of congressional
acquiescence and, accordingly, preempt the California law.246
Conversely, the federal memorandum in Medellín was intruding on
Government’s favor, given the weakness of the State’s interest, against the backdrop
of traditional state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure of European
Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of HVIRA.”).
241. See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 35–37.
242. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415 (internal quotations marks and alterations omitted).
243. Id. at 415–16.
244. Id.
245. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052,
1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that there is a clear executive policy against
recognizing the “Armenian Genocide,” that this policy has received congressional
“deference,” and that as such, it is “entitled to preemptive weight”), withdrawn, 629
F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
Arzoumanian v. Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft AG,
133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
246. See supra notes 63–69.
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criminal law, an area that has throughout history been unequivocally
entrusted to the states.
In light of this congressional acquiescence and the disparity
between California’s interest in adjudicating the subject matter
regarding insurance claims and Texas’s quintessential interest in
adjudicating matters of criminal law, Medellín’s extension to Movsesian
III is inappropriate.
III. THE YOUNGSTOWN POWER-SHARING MODEL IS MORE LIKELY TO
YIELD RATIONAL POLICY CHOICES AND ACCORD WITH DEMOCRATIC
VALUES THAN CURTISS-WRIGHT’S UNITARY EXECUTIVE MODEL
The above discussion demonstrates that there are good reasons to
accept that Movsesian III is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
formulation of foreign affairs preemption in Medellín.247
The
question still remains, however, whether that conception of foreign
affairs preemption is a normatively good one.
This Part argues that the conception of power sharing captured in
both Medellín and Movsesian III as consistent with Youngstown is good
for several reasons.
First, the Youngstown model’s vision of
congressional-executive cooperation carries structural advantages
that are outweighed by the secrecy and dispatch advantages offered
by the unitary executive model.248 Second, beyond the above
consequentialist considerations, the Youngstown model is superior
because it is more consistent with deontological commitments to a
democratic model of constitutional government.249 In so far as the
Supreme Court’s decision in Movsesian III is consistent with the
Court’s holding in Youngstown, the Ninth Circuit espouses a sound
conception of the executive power in foreign affairs.
A multiple advocacy model of foreign affairs decision making,
where various advocates from both inside and outside of the
executive engage in structured debate over conflicting positions, is
structurally superior to Curtiss-Wright’s unitary, rational national actor
model.250
These structural advantages result from a realistic
recognition of the limitations that individual cognitive abilities

247. See supra Part II.A–C.
248. George, supra note 85, at 752 (arguing that foreign policy decision making is
more effective when people with different opinions from outside and inside the executive
branch participate in discussion than when there is one unitary decision maker).
249. KOH, supra note 46, at 212–13 (finding unpersuasive the arguments against
congressional involvement in foreign policy).
250. George, supra note 85, at 752.
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face.251 To account for these limitations, the multiple advocacy
model includes various voices advocating for conflicting courses of
action in foreign-policy decision making procedures.252 In so doing,
the multiple advocacy model ensures that the Executive makes
foreign policy choices after a careful analysis of differing perspectives
and on the basis of complete information.253 Stanford University
professor Alexander L. George states, in so far as
there is significant disagreement among policy makers on . . . foreign
policy ideology and related cognitive beliefs, . . . a more openly
competitive system . . . is more likely to secure a critical
examination and weighing of [such beliefs], . . . than a highly
centralized policy-making system.254

In an organizational framework affording “structured, balanced
debate among policy advocates” from inside and outside the
executive branch, foreign policy decisions are more likely to be
rational and adequately assessed.255
Additionally, social studies of decision making systems provide
evidence that certain amounts of conflict over choices in a group can
have a productive influence on the group’s problem solving abilities
and on the quality of its choices.256 Joseph Bower, a Harvard
University professor, argued that conflict is significant for motivating
individuals to engage in constructive thought and analysis.257 In a
unitary executive model, the Executive’s decision making procedures

251. See Steven B. Redd & Alex Mintz, Policy Perspectives on National Security and
Foreign Policy Decision Making, 41 POL’Y STUD. J. S11, S13 (2013) (arguing that
“individuals face constraints that limit decision-makers’ computational
capabilities . . . [and] memory and recall abilities”).
252. George, supra note 85, at 751.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 752.
255. Id. at 751.
256. See, e.g., NORMAN R.F. MAIER, PROBLEM SOLVING AND CREATIVITY: IN
INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 217–18 (1970) (collating and summarizing studies assessing
the effects of conflict in problem solving in group dynamics); L. Richard Hoffman,
Conditions for Creative Problem Solving, 52 J. PSYCHOL. 429, 430–37, 440 (1961)
(contending that differing opinions as to the appropriate solution from different
group members is one condition for creative problem-solving); Victor H. Vroom et
al., The Consequences of Social Interaction in Group Problem Solving, 4 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 77, 90, 94–95 (1969) (arguing that group evaluation of
different solutions to a specific problem is more effective than such evaluation
performed by a single person).
257. Joseph L. Bower, The Role of Conflict in Economic Decision-Making Groups: Some
Empirical Results, 79 Q. J. ECON. 263, 272, 276–77 (1965) (comparing unanimity versus
majority rule procedures).
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lack these advantages.258 When the President makes choices via selfservient procedures that involve the input of only a few similarly
minded individuals, the environment for critical thought and
adversarial assessment is diminished.259 Accordingly, policy choices
are more prone to mistake and bias.260
Furthermore, “[a] highly centralized decision-making system . . .
can easily overburden the top-level decision-maker.”261 Making this
assessment in the context of President Nixon’s highly centralized
National Security Council, George noted that fostering too much
reliance on one cognitively limited decision maker likely weakens the
entire system.262 Establishing a structure in which conflicting voices
from Congress receive space for expression and influence, as the
Youngstown model does, combats against exactly such dangers.263
This is not to say that the multiple advocacy model is perfect. For
example, successful multiple advocacy often requires time-intensive
procedures, which may place unrealistic expectations on the
government in time-sensitive situations.264 Furthermore, employing
the multiple advocacy model does not necessarily mean that the best
foreign policy decisions will prevail.265 This is because the character
and advocacy skills of a position’s advocate, in addition to the
substantive merits of his or her position, determine whether the
decision maker adopts the position.266 In other words, a particularly
skilled advocate may advance an inferior foreign policy choice if the
superior choice is less adequately presented. Additionally, conflict
fostered in a multiple advocacy model may also go too far and disrupt
decision making on certain issues.267
258. George, supra note 85, at 752.
259. See id. (arguing that a decision making environment wherein different
ideologies openly compete is more likely to “secure a critical examination and
weighing” of the different options than a unitary or centralized model).
260. Id. at 755.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id. (asserting that there is significant risk of overloading the Executive
without strong and competent centers cooperating from other parts of the government).
264. Id. at 759.
265. See id. at 752 (explaining that in addition to the process by which the
executive makes decisions, other factors such as actors’ “[i]deological premises and
cognitive beliefs about [their] opponent[s] and about the nature of the international
system” impact the value of decisions).
266. See id. at 759 (describing how expertise, knowledge, and “analytical resources
bearing on the policy issue in question” may be disparately allocated among each
position’s different advocate and impact which position is adopted).
267. Id. at 785.
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None of these criticisms, however, dismantle the multiple advocacy
model. All systems of decision making entail costs.268 Scholars have
noted that though multiple advocacy may be imperfect, history has
demonstrated that “the absence of effective multiple advocacy . . .
can . . . have very serious costs in terms of the maladaptive policies it
generates.”269 Historical incidents since George wrote this article in
1972, such as the Iran-Contra Affair and the War on Terror, have
further confirmed the fact that centralized decision making
procedures produce detrimental policies. The major historical
mishaps of the last few decades have resulted not from too extensive a
congressional involvement in foreign policy decisions but rather a too
secretive and unitary Executive.270
Further, beyond these consequentialist advantages, the Youngstown
model of multiple advocacy is also superior because it represents a
commitment to a vision of constitutional government that transcends
the consequentialist notions of speed and secrecy. Implicit but
monumental in Youngstown was the premise that “certain principles
are so central to [the American] notion[] of constitutional government
that no president should knowingly violate them, even in the pursuit
of the most efficient and effective foreign-policy-making mechanism.”271
The Constitution emerged in a time of extreme trepidation
towards the idea of a unitary authority at the head of government.272
This historical context suggests that the Founders largely espoused a
system more similar to the multiple advocacy model.273 During the
American Revolution, the Founders had just revolted against a ruler
they perceived to be a dictator who controlled the British parliament
and exploited his power.274 In fact, so acute was their awareness of
this tyranny that the first time they formed a government they created

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See supra note 87 (summarizing scholarship that contends Water Gate, the
Iran-Contra Affair, and the War on Terror were the result of overly centralized
executive authority).
271. KOH, supra note 46, at 213.
272. SAVAGE, supra note 7, at 14–15.
273. Id.
274. See id. (describing and affirming the Founders’ fears regarding too strong an
executive branch). But see JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF
EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH xiv, 20–51 (2009)
(rejecting arguments that the Framers of 1787 designed a weak presidential office
and instead arguing that the Framers’ intended “to create a Presidency with broad,
rather open-ended powers in . . . foreign affairs and national security”).
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no executive in it at all.275 While they found the lack of an executive
unsatisfactory and revised this strategy later, their awareness of the
dangers posed by the consolidation of power in the executive was
formative.276 As such, the Founders provided specific safeguards
against such consolidation through a structure of checks and
balances,277 which is most succinctly summarized in Justice Jackson’s
concurrence in Youngstown.
As established above, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Movsesian III
was by and large consistent with the framework intended by the
Founders and outlined in Youngstown. The President’s policy against
recognizing the Armenian Genocide had received congressional
acquiescence on three separate occasions and therefore had received
opportunity for congressional input.278 Taken in addition to the
states’ historically equivocal power over insurance regulation and the
absence of concerns over transfer of power from domestic to
international courts, the factual circumstances in Movsesian III dictate
towards the Ninth Circuit’s final holding to preempt the California law.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Movsesian III rightly applied foreign
affairs preemption to invalidate a California law that extended the
statute of limitations for victims of the Armenian Genocide. Contrary
to what scholars have argued, Medellín did nothing to limit the
previous bounds of the executive’s power to preempt contrary state
laws, following precedent already established in Youngstown.
Movsesian III, largely following that same precedent, came to the
opposite conclusion because of three essential differences in the
factual circumstances of the two cases.
First, in Movsesian III, there was evidence of repeated congressional
acquiescence to the President’s policy whereas in Medellín no such
congressional acquiescence was present. In Medellín, the President
attempted to implement a non-self-executing treaty by way of a
unilateral executive action contained in a memorandum. Because
the power to execute laws, including laws implementing non-selfexecuting treaties, belongs quintessentially to Congress, the
President’s act inherently conflicted with the will of Congress. The
presence of this conflict placed Medellín in category three of
275.
276.
277.
278.

SAVAGE, supra note 7, at 14–15.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
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Youngstown. Movsesian III on the other hand had received explicit
congressional acquiescence on numerous occasions as evidenced by
Congress’s willingness to halt the passing of legislation contrary to
the President’s will. As such, the President’s policy in Movsesian III
belonged in the second category of Youngstown.
Second, Movsesian III and Medellín were critically different in that
Movsesian III involved insurance regulation, an area of law that has
passed between the states and the federal government throughout its
history. In Medellín, the matter before the court involved criminal
law, an area of law that occupies an unequivocal place in the canon of
powers allocated to the states. As a result, criminal laws and
judgments tend to be qualitatively more resilient to preemption by
informal federal policies and foreign courts’ judgments.
Finally, Medellín and Movsesian III differed in that Movsesian III
involved no shift of power from domestic to international courts.
Conversely, in Medellín, enforcing the President’s memorandum
would have transferred power over some criminal judgments to the
ICJ, a consequence of which the judiciary is highly weary. Because of
these unique circumstances, Medellín’s broad application to other
cases, including Movsesian III, is inappropriate.
In light of this analysis, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Movsesian
III is a normatively sound commitment to Youngstown’s balanced
vision of separation of powers. This model is most apt to produce
rational policy choices by subjecting foreign policy decisions to
critical debate. In so doing, the Youngstown model safeguards
against overburdening one cognitively limited executive and
accounts for these inevitable cognitive limits by including additional
voices. Beyond these consequentialist advantages, the Youngstown
model is also deontologically superior because it accords more
closely with foundational democratic values upon which American
constitutional law was built.

